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From Special Privilege to Social Rights 
Universalism in Social Policy 
On March n, 2008, Chile's Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) 
signed an important piece of legislation into law. Law 20.2 5 5 reformed the 
country's pension system, introducing a solidaristic pillar that guaranteed a 
state-funded minimum or supplementary pension to the bottom 60 percent of 
income earners. The new law represented one of the most significant advance-
ments in recent history for the social rights of Chile's low-income workers, 
rural sector inhabitants, and women, granting them access to a basic minimum 
income in their old age. Moreover, the reform was fully funded, ensuring that 
the state could maintain the commitment for years to come. Indeed, as President 
Bachelet put it herself, "The truth is that it would have been easy to engage in 
populist politics at the cost of the dreams of our seniors. We, however, did not 
fall victim to this temptation. We opted, instead, to guarantee social rights" 
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 2008, 3362, italics and translation 
by author). Although Chile was able to integrate greater universalism into the 
pension system, the same was not true for family assistance and education 
policy, where reforms enacted during the r99os and early 2000s did little to 
eliminate existing inequalities. 
During this same time period, just over the Cordillera de los Andes, 
Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez (2005-2010) was also engaged in a 
sweeping effort to reconfigure that country's social protection system. After 
just two years in office, the Frente Amplio (FA) administration had passed 
a wide-reaching health care reform that expanded coverage among children 
and strengthened the public sector. The left/center-left government also uni-
fied Uruguay's family allowance system, equalizing the benefits for formal and 
informal sector workers and providing income support to the bottom half of 
the income distribution. Still, the first Frente Amplio administration finished 
its term in office without having made a significant change to education policy. 
I 
2 Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America 
The Chilean and Uruguayan reforms marked a new direction in social policy, 
placing an emphasis on universalism and on the provision of benefits as a r~ght 
of citizenship. This focus, however, was not integral to the policy initiauves 
carried out by all of Latin America's left-leaning governments during the early 
2000s. Indeed, in 2003, Venezuela's leftist president, Hugo Chavez (1999-
present), began to construct an entirely new social welfare system alongside 
the existing state infrastructure. Chavez's initiatives, known as the Bolivarian 
missions, aimed at improving access to select education and health services as 
well as providing targeted income transfers, but the initiatives did not gene~-
ally represent a move toward universalism in social protection. Similarly, Ill 
Argentina, the Peronist Party (PJ) administrations of President Nestor Kirch-
ner (2003-2007) and President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-present) 
enacted some reforms that moved toward greater universalism, such as the 20° 8 
nationalization of the pension system and the 2009 universal child allowance, 
but the initiatives lacked a stable funding source and the country's progress 
was generally slower than that seen in Chile and Uruguay. 
The events in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela underscore several 
puzzling questions. First, why did these four countries - all headed by parties 
of the left/center-left, 1 with similar levels of development, democratic politics, 
and high exposure to international markets - pursue different reforms? Why 
did President Bachelet choose to maintain a private pension system, but add to 
it a citizenship-based flat-rate benefit, whereas Argentina opted to return to a 
state-run contributory system? Why did Chile create a new pension system, but 
leave family assistance virtually untouched? Why did Uruguay's FA successfully 
reform health care and family assistance programs, but fail with regard to 
education policy? More broadly, what does this series of reforms suggest about 
Latin America's left-leaning political parties and the ability of the "left turn" 
to produce meaningful changes in poverty and inequality? 2 
' I recognize that Venezuela's Socialist Party (PSUV) is located significantly further to the left 
than Chile's Concertaci6n parties or the FA, but differentiating between left, center-left, cen· 
ter, center-right, and right would create an unwieldy typology with sixteen separate categories. 
Therefore, I choose to combine all left-leaning parties into one category of left/center-left and 
all right-leaning parties into a similar category of right/center-right. I also realize that catego· 
rizing the PJ as a left/center-left organization is controversial because the party includes some 
right-wing politicians and supporters. Although it is true that the party's ideology has fluctu· 
ated across time, many scholars have classified the PJ as left/center-left during the Kirchner 
years. For examples of such work, see: Levitsky and Murillo (2oo8)· Huber and Stephens 
(20~2); _Niedzwiecki (2010); Levitsky and Roberts (20rr); Etchemendy and Garay (20II_); 
Schipam (2012); and Ostiguy (2009). I discuss the classification of the PJ in greater depth 111 
Chapter 7. 
2 
The "left turn" refers to the first decade of the twenty-first century, when ten Latin American 
state~ elected left-leaning executives. These countries were: Argentina (2003 , 2007, and 20II), 
Brazil (2002, 2006, and 20Io), Bolivia (2005 and 2009), Chile (2ooo and 2oo6), Ecuador (2006 
and 2009), El Salvador (2009), Nicaragua (2006), Paraguay (2008), Uruguay (2004 and 201°), 
and Venezuela ( I998, 2000, and 2006). 
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This book seeks to answer these questions, presenting a new theory about 
the role of policy legacies, electoral competition, and political parties in shaping 
social welfare policies. In particular, I argue that policy legacies influence social 
policy reform by structuring the kinds of policy adjustments that are needed, 
and by empowering some organizations while weakening others. In addition, I 
contend that electoral competition influences reform initiatives because parties 
that face a strong opposition are more likely to engage in universalistic reforms. 
Finally, I find evidence that the character of political parties, which I define 
as the combination of ideology, internal organization, and external linkage 
mechanism, has a profound effect on the nature of social policy reform. In 
particular, I find that two types of left/center-left parties, those which I identify 
as electoral-professional and constituency-coordinating, have made progress 
toward universalism in social policy, while a third type, which I classify as 
non-programmatic-electoral, has enjoyed less success,3 Thus, the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter 2 sheds light on the question of why parties 
with a similar ideological orientation sometimes pursue different social policy 
reforms and what such variation means for the ability of Latin American states 
to build sustainable and equitable systems of social protection. It, therefore, 
contributes a new perspective that builds on and refines extant theories of 
welfare state development. The book also contributes to the growing literature 
on Latin America's left turn, presenting a new classification of parties that 
helps explain the high levels of heterogeneity among the region's left-leaning 
governments. 
Equitable and Sustainable Social Policy: Latin America's Dilemma 
The goal of building equitable and sustainable social policies is a challenge 
faced by countries around the world. While most states provide some form of 
social protection, the way such programs are financed, designed, and admin-
istered varies significantly and these differences have consequences for the 
well-being of individuals and families. By the mid-to-late twentieth century, 
a handful of Latin American countries had developed advanced social pro-
tection systems rooted in the Bismarckian social insurance tradition (Huber 
1996; Pribble 20rr; Dion 2010; Filgueira and Filgueira 1997; Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008). In these countries, social expenditure constituted a sizable 
share of state outlays, but a large portion of the population remained excluded 
from the programs. Moreover, the quality of social services and the size of trans-
fer payments in Latin America's advanced social protection states remained, 
for the most part, highly stratified across income and occupational categories, 
deepening inequality in the region. This is likely because Latin Ameri~an social 
protection generally developed in a manner that favored the urban middle and 
working classes (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 79-rr3). 
3 These party types are discussed in detail in Chapter 2 • 
4 Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America 
The inability of Latin America's advanced social protection systems to pro-
vide adequate coverage and reduce inequality results from a mismatch be_twe~n 
the structure of the region's labor market and the design of social pol~cy. n 
advanced industrialized democracies, welfare regimes grounded in the Bism_ar-
ckian tradition of contributory social insurance have been effective at prot~cu~g 
the bulk of the population, albeit in a more inegalitarian manner than JO t. e 
Nordic regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001). In Lat~n 
America, however, where a large share of the population works outside t e 
formal labor market, such systems inevitably generate coverage gaps and_exa~-
erbate inequality. The presence of informal workers has historic roots JO t e 
region, but this sector has grown precipitously since the decline of import 
substitution industrialization (ISI), and by the late 1990s, anywhere from 
30 percent to 40 percent of workers in Latin America's advanced social pro-
tection states operated in the informal sector (Portes and Hoffman 2003, s2 l• 
Because informal-sector workers do not pay payroll taxes, they lack access/~ 
contributory-based benefits such as pensions, family allowances, and hea t 
insurance. Furthermore, because salaries in the informal sector are on average 
lower, and the employment more precarious, it is precisely the poorest se~t?1
5 
of society that are excluded from such programs, thus widening the divI e 
between rich and poor. 
This disconnect between the socio-structural reality of Latin America's la~or 
market, namely that it is characterized by a large informal sector, and the desig~ 
of social protection systems, which are based on formal employment, create 
a paradoxical situation for the region's advanced social protection states a~ 
the turn of the twenty-first century: while the countries were heavily invested 
in social programs, the very neediest sectors of society were often exclude 
from policies. 4 Figure I.I presents the difference in levels of pension cover~ge 
between the top and bottom income quintiles among the economically acuve 
population in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela.5 As illustrated by t~e 
figure, low-income workers affiliate with the pension systems in these countnes 
at a much lower rate than workers in the top income quintile. Moreov~r, ~h~ 
figure reveals that this coverage gap grew between 1992 and 2006. A sim~la 
trend is evident in Figure 1.2, which depicts the difference in levels of penswn 
coverage between the top and bottom income quintiles among the elderl_y 
population during the 1990s and 2000s. 6 With the exception of Uruguay, this 
4 Esping-Andersen (2002) and Filgueira (2006) both make a similar diagnosis about the disjuncrure 
between new risk structures and old social welfare architecture. 
5 The data used to calculate the difference are taken from Rofman, Lucchetti, and Ourens (2008 • 
32-119). High values represent a large coverage gap, whereas small values signify that coverage 
is relatively similar between the upper and lower income quintiles. 
6 In both Figures r.r and r.2, I dropped the observation for Venezuela in 2001 because of concern 
that the figure was incorrect. Reported coverage of pensions among the elderly population in the 
bottom income quintile increased by fifteen percentage points in 2001 and then fell by sixteen 
points in 2002 (Rofman, Lucchetti, and Ourens 2008, u7). 
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(Economically Active Population). Source: Author's calculation based on data from 
Rofman, Lucchetti, and Ourens (2008). 
difference was generally greater than twenty percentage points and increased 
steadily throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
The fact that pension coverage among the poorest workers and senior citi-
zens was anywhere from ten to sixty points lower than that of the top income 
quintile provides evidence of the inability of Latin America's social protection 
systems to adequately reach excluded sectors. By the late 1990s, a confluence 
of factors, including growing electoral pressure, international attention, and 
improved economic growth, facilitated a series of social policy reforms aimed 
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at expanding coverage and reducing the stratification of benefits. The drive 
toward such reforms, however, has been a difficult one, as policy makers face a 
significant challenge: how to expand coverage and improve quality in a fi~c~lly 
sustainable manner. Achieving this goal often involves reallocating existing 
expenditure in addition to increasing spending - a politically charged task. . 
Figure r.3 provides a visual account of the political dilemma faced by Laun 
America's advanced social protection states. In the figure, the x-axis represents 
the levels of spending on social welfare programs, ranging from limited funding 
to high but sustainable spending. The y-axis represents the nature of benefits, 
ranging from segmented (with only small sectors receiving highly unequal ben-
efits) to universal access and benefit levels. Using this typology, I identify four 
basic types of welfare provision: (r) underfunded but semi-universal systems; 
(2) high and sustainable funding and universal to semi-universal systems; (3) 
highly funded but segmented systems; and (4) low-spending and segmented 
systems. By the end of the twentieth century, Latin America's advanced social 
protection states would have been located somewhere in quadrants three or 
four, and therefore faced one of two challenges: (r) to expand spending and 
universalism (moving from quadrant four to quadrant two) or (2) to reform the 
allocation of funds in order to increase universalism (moving from quadrant 
three to quadrant two). 
Clearly these two processes involve very different political calculations. Still, 
a general puzzle arises: what are the factors that explain a country's decision to 
move toward a more universal system of social protection? This book explores 
this question through a comparative analysis of Chile and Uruguay with a 
secondary focus on Argentina and Venezuela, concluding that the design of 
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previous policies, electoral competition, and the character of political parties 
influenced social policy reforms in all four countries. 
The issue of why some Latin American states have been more successful 
than others at reforming social protection systems in a manner that expands 
the coverage and quality of benefits for all citizens has not been fully explored 
by scholars of comparative politics. Indeed, extant research has generally 
focused on the determinants of spending levels (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 
2008; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001), the histor-
ical origins of policies (Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Haggard and Kaufman 2oo8; 
Dion 20ro; Pribble 2011; Huber 1996; Filgueira 2005; Martfnez Franzoni and 
Sanchez-Ancochea 2012), and the determinants of liberalizing reforms during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Dion 20ro; Castiglioni 2005a; Weyland 1996; Kaufman 
and Nelson 2004a; Brooks 2009; Madrid 2003; Nelson 1999; Grindle 2004a). 
Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Latin American states began to 
expand social expenditures, but the character of these new policy initiatives 
varied across countries and across policy sectors, and very little scholarship 
has contemplated the question of why such divergence exists.? In particular, 
the issue of why some countries have moved their social protection systems in 
the direction of greater universalism, whereas others have carried out reforms 
that deepen segmentation, has not been fully explored. This question is pressing 
in both political and practical terms, as it provides insight into the potential 
paths that lead to more universal social policy, which is crucial for reducing 
poverty and addressing Latin America's high levels of income inequality. 
Defining Universalism in Latin America 
Studies of social welfare policy often use spending levels as a proxy for the 
relative size and strength of social protection programs. General expenditure 
figures, however, are misleading in the Latin American context because they 
do not permit an analysis of who receives benefits and of stratification in the 
quality of services and generosity of transfers. Moreover, while state expendi-
ture is a crucial component of social protection, other aspects of public policy, 
namely regulatory standards and the design of financing mechanisms, also have 
important implications for the universality and quality of welfare policies. 
Clearly, then, an analysis concerned with the ability of La tin American states 
to build more inclusive and universal social protection systems cannot rely 
solely on expenditure data. For this reason, this book develops and analyzes 
a new dependent variable: universalism. Universalism refers to social policies 
that guarantee coverage for a set of essential social services (preschool, primary, 
and secondary education as well as health care) and ensure a basic minimum 
income during the working years and after exiting the labor market because 
7 Research that does consider this period includes: Castiglioni (2010); Dion (2010); Huber and 
Stephens (2012); and Ewig and Kay (20u). 
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of old age, sickness, or unemployment. 8 In this way, the concept of unive:· 
salism recognizes the important role of state-provided social spending, but is 
simultaneously concerned with the question of whether this spending reaches 
marginalized populations. The concept builds on and expands the notion of 
basic universalism, which Filgueira et al. (2006) define as a system of social 
protection that guarantees coverage for all citizens for a group of essential 
services and transfers. In such a system, the state plays a central role in the 
provision of benefits, but also in ensuring that all individuals can access and 
effectively use the services and transfers. Examples of basic universal welfare 
policies include a flat-rate citizenship pension, a guaranteed minimum citizen-
ship income, a public preschool system, and state guarantees to cover a group 
of health risks (Filgueira et al. 2006, 40-5 5). My definition of universalism 
goes one step further, contemplating to what extent social policies improve the 
quality of services and the size of transfer payments, as well as whether the 
financing of such programs is fiscally sustainable. 
To assess the character of social policy reforms in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela, I evaluate policies along four dimensions: (r) To what extent 
does the new policy universalize coverage? (2) To what extent are policies 
administered in a transparent (rather than discretionary) manner? (3) To what 
extent do policies ensure quality public services or reduce segmentation in th_e 
size of income transfers? (4) To what extent is the financing mechanism equi-
table and sustainable? Using these dimensions, I rank each social policy reform 
as "pure universalism," "advanced universalism," "moderate universalism," 
"weak universalism," "neutral," "regressive," or "failed reform." 
This conceptualization differs from existing definitions of universalism, 
which are rooted in the experience of advanced industrialized democracies. 
In that context, a universal system is one in which all citizens have access to 
social services of a similarly high quality and receive generous income transfers. 
In the context of contemporary Latin America, the consolidation of such a wel-
fare state is highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term. Still, some countries 
in the region have begun to create programs that expand coverage, equalize 
benefit levels, and narrow the gap in the quality of public services. Additio?-
ally, some states have started to ensure that access to benefits is defined 1ll 
legal terms, avoiding political manipulation, and a handful of states have taken 
great care to construct a sustainable funding source for new policies. I con-
tend that such progress constitutes a move toward universalism and warrants 
investigation, and therefore, I create a measure that allows for an assessment 
of degrees of progress. Whereas a binary conceptualization of universalism 
would reveal no variation across Latin America, my measure provides insight 
into important differences that exist between states in the region with regard 
8 Other policies such as public provision of family planning, water, sanitation, and electricity are 
also of great importance to low-income families. Because of space constraints, I choose to focus 
on the traditional areas of welfare state policy. 
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to the design of recent social policy reforms. Thus, although different from the 
traditional understanding of universalism, this measure is useful. Moreover, 
the dimensions identified in the measure provide insight into the fundamental 
question of whether or not all citizens receive relatively equal welfare benefits. 
Indeed, if a country provides quality public services and income transfers that 
are of a similar size to 100 percent of the population, then it seems safe to call 
the welfare state universal, regardless of whether or not the system is unified. 
I also include a dimension related to the administration of benefits and to the 
sustainability of funding because historically in Latin America, clientelism and 
boom-bust spending cycles have undermined the ability of states to guarantee 
a minimum level of social protection. 
Using this new measure, reforms that achieve "pure universalism" are char-
acterized by 100 percent coverage and benefits that are granted in a transparent 
manner. The policy initiatives promote similarly sized transfer payments and 
quality public services. Finally, the programs are financed in an equitable and 
sustainable manner. None of the countries included in this study achieved "pure 
universalism," but Chile and Uruguay both carried out "advanced" reforms in 
the domains of health care and noncontributory social assistance. "Advanced" 
reforms increase coverage, ensuring access for at least the bottom 50 percent 
of the income distribution, and they administer benefits in a legally defined 
and transparent manner so as to minimize political manipulation. Moreover, 
"advanced" reforms include mechanisms aimed at standardizing the size of 
transfer payments and the quality of social services, but often fall short of 
obtaining full equality because of low levels of spending. These funding con-
straints are generated by the fact that the financial base of "advanced" reforms, 
while more equitable and sustainable than in previous periods, remains imper-
fect. The third category of reforms exhibits improvement on three dimen-
sions of the measure but fails to make progress on one dimension. Argentina's 
2006 education reform falls into this "moderate" category. The fourth type 
of social policy reform is classified as "weak universalism," which means the 
reform advanced on two of the four dimensions of universalism. Several of 
Argentina's initiatives during the early 2000s are classified as "weak," as is the 
199 5 Chilean education reform, which increased coverage but failed to ensure 
a quality education for all children and exacerbated the equity of financing. 
The fifth category of the dependent variable is "neutral" and describes ini-
tiatives that failed to produce any substantial change in at least three of the 
four dimensions of universalism. Venezuela carried out four neutral reforms 
to social assistance policy during the early 2000s, administering services in a 
transparent manner but failing to improve coverage, transfer size, and funding 
sustainability. Finally, "regressive reforms" are those that exacerbate problems 
of coverage, inequality, and financing, while "failed reform" occurs in systems 
in which no change was enacted. Argentina's health and pension reforms dur-
ing the administration of President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) are examples 
of regressive reforms because they decreased coverage and increased benefit 
IO Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America 
segmentation. An example of failed reform was also witnessed in Argentina, 
where President Menem was unable to alter the country's health care system for 
retirees. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7 present an in-depth discussion of my codin? of 
education, health, and noncontributory social assistance reforms in Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, but the standards that I use for scoring the 
legislation are summarized in Table 1.1. 
Before advancing further, it is important to clearly define the four dimen-
sions of this measure of universalism. In the context of advanced industrialized 
democracies, universalism is associated with the Nordic welfare regimes and is 
defined as a system that provides generous benefits to all citizens, regardless of 
income, labor market status, or sex. In these universalistic welfare states, ben-
efits are coupled with high tax rates, and therefore, the transfers and services 
consumed by high-income earners are recovered by the state through income 
taxes. In Latin America, by contrast, tax systems are notoriously weak, and 
therefore, the process of "universalism" cannot be expected to work in an id~n-
tical manner. For this reason, I contend that social policy reforms that provide 
automatic access to benefits (without discretionary criteria) to at least the bo_t-
tom 50 percent of the income distribution should be considered as moving in 
a universal direction (advanced universalism). Thus, the further a state moves 
past 50 percent coverage, the stronger the trend toward universalism. Still, it 
is important to consider not only how broad coverage is, but also how that 
coverage is obtained, namely what criteria are used to identify beneficiaries. 
This is because in universal welfare states, benefits are granted as a legally 
defined right, which eliminates the possibility of using political criteria to favor 
some individuals and exclude others. Thus, I contend that in order for a state 
to qualify as having "advanced universalism," benefits must cover at least the 
bottom 50 percent of the income distribution and that access must be based 
on transparent and clearly defined criteria, not discretionary factors such as 
political favoritism. 
This measure of universalism also considers whether policies improve the 
quality of social services and the size of income transfers. In this way, I con-
tend that policies should be considered fully universal if they guarantee that: 
( 1) individuals using the public health system receive quality care for a set 
of fundamental services, (2) that children enrolled in public education receive 
quality schooling, and (3) that noncontributory transfer payments are gener-
ous, thereby reducing benefit segmentation between formal and informal sector 
workers. 9 This study also considers whether the financing of social programs 
is equitable, namely whether it eases the burden on the poorest sectors of 
society, and if the funding is sustainable. By sustainable financing, I refer to 
9 Employees and employers pay into the contributory system, so it stands to reason that those ben-
efits will be larger than noncontributory income transfers, which are financed through general 
revenue. Still, the size of this gap can be narrowed if the state invests heavily in the noncontrib-
utory system. 
TABLE r.r. Categories and Scoring of Universalism 
Pure Advanced Moderate Weak Failed 
Universalism Universalism Universalism Universalism Neutral Regressive Reform Reform 
Achieves universal Ioo¾ universal Increased coverage, Reform exacerbates No reform 
coverage arriving at more coverage adopted 
than 50% problems 
Character of policy Automatic right Transparent Provoked Provoked No change or Granted in a No reform 
implementation of all citizens provision to a large change on change on change on particularistic and adopted 
(transparent vs. segment (more three two only one nontransparent 
discretionary) than 50%) of dimensions dimensions dimension manner. Political 
population. This manipulation is 
group is clearly possible or 
defined in legal present. 
terms, and political 
manipulation is not 
present. 
Ensures quality Yes Improvement, albeit Reform exacerbates No reform 
services and imperfect inequality in adopted 
reduces services and 
segmentation in transfers 
benefit generosity 
Equitable and Broad Improved financing, Reform undermines No reform 
sustainable progressive albeit imperfect financing adopted 
financing financing 
system 
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policy reforms that are tied to a steady revenue source. Using these defini~ion_s, 
I evaluate reforms to health care, social assistance, and education policy in 
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7, based on how far each initiative moved in the direction 
of universalism. ro 
The Argument 
The role of left parties in building and expanding universal welfare sra:es 
in advanced industrialized democracies has been confirmed by an extensive 
body of research (Hicks 1999; Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 
2001; Korpi 1989). In the context of contemporary Latin America, b~ c~n-
trast, many scholars have argued that ideological divisions have been sigmfi-
cantly weakened by the constraints imposed by economic liberalization and 
globalization (Weyland 2004a; Madrid 2003; Brooks 2009; Kaufman and 
Nelson 20046). Still, other studies have uncovered important differences in the 
character of regulatory, labor, and social policies adopted by left-leaning and 
right-leaning governments (Huber et al. 2006; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 
2009; Castiglioni 20osa; Murillo 2005, 2002; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
2001; Blafield 2012). 
This study builds on both of these bodies of literature, but improves and 
refines the arguments by focusing not only on ideology, but also on the orga-
nizational structure and predominant linkage mechanism employed by par-
ties. This focus on overall party character, which I define as the combination 
of ideology, internal organization, and external linkage mechanism, is inn~-
vative and bridges two bodies of political science research that have, until 
now, remained separated. Specifically, I argue that the internal organization 
of political parties, particularly the strength of the tie between elites and base 
organizations, in combination with the party's ideology and the predominant 
linkage mechanism employed to appeal to the core constituency, has a pro-
found effect on the timing and content of social policy reform. The classifi-
cation of party character developed in Chapter 2 identifies four party types: 
constituency-coordinating, electoral-professional, charismatic-movement, and 
non-programmatic-electoral, which exist on both sides of the ideological 
spectrum. u Each of the party types influences the content of social policy 
reform by determining the distribution of power inside the party and shaping 
what kinds of policy initiatives are likely to be pursued. 
The theoretical framework also builds on extant literature that emphasizes 
the causal impact of previous policy design, or policy legacies. 12 I confirm the 
10 I experimented with weighing some dimensions of the measure more heavily than others, but 
the overall scores were not generally affected, and therefore, I decided to count each dimension 
equally in an effort to increase the transparency of the measure. 
11 These distinctions are discussed at great length in Chapter 2. 
12 The concept of policy legacies was first developed by Pierson (1994); Esping-Andersen (199o); 
and Huber and Stephens (2001). 
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importance of these legacies, finding evidence that they influence the nature of 
social policy reforms in Latin America. This is because policy legacies shape 
the distribution of power and interests inside distinct policy sectors. This dis-
tribution, in turn, determines the costs and benefits that politicians face when 
attempting to reform existing programs, and therefore shapes the content of 
social policy initiatives. 
The third and final variable that I argue influences the design of social policy 
reform is the nature of electoral competition. I find that electoral competition 
shapes policy reforms through two mechanisms. First, in a setting where elec-
toral competition is intense, parties face incentives to carry out reforms that 
appeal to a broad sector of society. In addition to the intensity of competition, 
I argue that it is also important to consider where on the political spectrum 
that competition is located. Specifically, left-leaning parties that face intense 
competition from the right might be pushed to enact relatively centrist reforms 
in order to attract moderate voters. Similarly, when parties of the right face 
intense competition from the left, they may carry out reforms that expand state 
involvement in an effort to appeal to a wider range of voters. 
I hypothesize that each of the three variables included in my argument are 
necessary causes of social policy reform and interact equally to determine the 
outcome. This is not to say that party character, electoral competition, and 
policy legacies are the only factors that shape social policy reforms. Indeed, a 
number of other variables, including economic performance, civil society mobi-
lization, international pressure, and political-institutional design, also influence 
the design of policy outputs. Still, I contend that these effects are secondary to 
the impact of party character, electoral competition, and policy legacies. 
Existing Explanations of Latin American Social Policy Reform 
The theoretical framework developed and tested in this book builds on a large 
and rich body of scholarship that explores causal determinants of Latin Amer-
ican social policy. In general terms, existing explanations have focused on eco-
nomic and political-institutional variables. As demonstrated in Chapters 3-7, 
many of these factors also influenced recent social policy reforms in Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The evidence presented in the case studies, 
however, suggests that, although important, these variables were secondary 
causal factors. In this way, the key variables analyzed in this book - policy 
legacies, electoral competition, and party character - worked in combination 
with several other factors to produce the given social policy outputs. 
Economic Explanations: Globalization and Growth 
Globalization, or the increased flow of goods, capital, people, and ideas across 
national borders, has been cited by many authors as an important determinant 
of variation in social spending levels (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; 
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Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001) and in the desi_gn 
of social protection systems (Rudra 2008; Brooks 2009; Dion 2010). Specifi-
cally, some have argued that foreign direct investment can result in a "race _to 
the bottom" with regard to labor standards, tax codes, and subsequently social 
protection systems (McKenzie and Lee 1991). Globalization may also influe~ce 
social policy decisions because of the pressure that policy makers face to mai~-
tain the confidence of international investors (Brooks 2009). Upholding t~is 
trust requires governments to avoid deficits, which in turn may result in social 
spending cuts. In the case of Chile and Uruguay, my interviews turned up no 
evidence that these pressures influenced social policy formation. Instead, wh~n 
I questioned elites about the motivation for maintaining balanced budgets (,~ 
the case of the Concertaci6n and FA governments) or for engaging in deficit 
spending (in the case of the Colorado and Blanco governments), the reasons 
cited were tied to domestic political pressures and party preferences (Personal 
Interviews #r, 3,'4, 6, ro, 17, 18, 20, 21, 36, 43, 55, 66, 68, 69, 92). . 
A final way that globalization is thought to influence social policy formati?n 
is through the involvement of external actors, namely international financial 
institutions (IFis), in the policy-making process. The role of IFis during the 
current neoliberal era has been significant, with institutions such as the World 
Bank (WB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) making sizable loans to countries for the purposes 
of economic stabilization and structural adjustment. The loan process provides 
IFis with the leverage to encourage reforms of a particular type by means of 
conditionality. For this reason, some studies find that the involvement of IFis 
can influence the nature of social policy reforms (Madrid 2003; Lakin 2oo6; 
Nelson 1999). 
In the case of Chile and Uruguay, while IFis have been involved in policy 
making, it does not appear that these organizations were able to decisively shape 
the content of reform packages. Even in the midst of Uruguay's devastating 
2002 financial crisis, the country was able negotiate spending protections for ~11 
social sectors with the IADB and the WB, allowing the state to maintain social 
expenditure at pre-crisis levels. An official from the government of Colorado 
President Jorge Batlle (2000-2005) told me that obtaining these guarantees 
required tough negotiations, but that ultimately they were able to extract the 
guarantees (Personal Interview #3 ). Similarly in Chile, despite the use of WB 
loans, an official from the Aylwin and Frei governments told me: "[T]he long 
and the short of it is that there was a great deal of symmetry in the relationship 
with the World Bank. They didn't force anything on us and couldn't force 
anything on us" (Personal Interview #28). 
This comment was echoed by other policy makers, one of whom reminded 
me that many representatives of the Chilean state are consultants for the WB 
and do not feel pressured by the so-called Washington technocrats (Personal 
Interview #79). Thus, while IFis provided proposals for policy design, it does 
not appear that these organizations were able to force the adoption of those 
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reforms. An alternative interpretation of the IFI argument would suggest that 
the low level of IMF and World Bank involvement in Chile and Uruguay 
might help explain the ability of those two states to pursue more universalistic 
reforms. Such an explanation, however, has a difficult time accounting for 
variation across policy sectors inside the two cases. Moreover, IFI involvement 
in Venezuela has also been low since President Chavez's turn toward more 
radical policy in the early 2000s, but as discussed in Chapter 7, the left-leaning 
government has nonetheless been slow to produce universalizing reforms. 
Part of the reason why the influence of IFis appears weak in this analysis 
could be related to the time period under consideration. The views of the WB 
and other financial actors have moderated across time, and by the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, many IFis had begun to stress the importance of social 
investment (Ewig 2010, 59-92). In this way, the international context may 
have become more favorable to universalizing social policy by the early 2000s, 
thereby making this explanation less relevant than it was during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Several studies of Latin American social policy formation 
find evidence that the international diffusion of ideas and policy models is a 
crucial determinant of policy outputs (Weyland 2004b; Madrid 2003; Martinez 
Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea 2012). Thus, it stands to reason that the 
renewed international interest in social investment could have helped promote 
more universalistic social policy. This shift in the international context and the 
prominent policy models, however, cannot explain why some Latin American 
states pursued social policy reforms that expanded universalism, whereas others 
did not. 
Another economic argument related to social policy formation is exempli-
fied by the common belief that economic growth is the most effective form of 
welfare. Because the ability of governments to expand social policy programs 
is closely tied to tax revenue, which in turn fluctuates with economic cycles, 
studies have rightly noted that economic performance has important effects 
on the scope of social protection systems (Foxley 2010). Moreover, periods of 
economic crisis and austerity can undermine social safety nets, as governments 
are forced to cut spending. Since the early 2000s, Latin America has experi-
enced a relative economic boom, thanks in part to a favorable export market. 
Indeed, the average growth rates for Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
between 2003 and 2010 were 6.62 percent, 3.99 percent, 5.31 percent, and 
5.01 percent, respectively. 13 These solid growth levels have undoubtedly facil-
itated the expansion of social spending during this same period. Still, while 
strong and stable economic growth may have helped boost social spending, it 
could not guarantee that these increases would respond to the needs of society's 
most vulnerable groups and move policy design in a more universal direction. 
'J This average was calculated using data from _the Worl_d Bank (2012). I use 2003 as the base 
year to avoid the dramatic declines witnessed 10 Argentma, Uruguay, and Venezuela as a result 
of the 2001 financial crisis. 
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In the case of Chile and Uruguay, the fact that the two countries' progre~s 
toward universalism has varied across policy sectors casts doubt on the ro ~ 
of economic growth as a key determinant of universalism. Indeed, if gro~t h 
were a direct cause of universalism, then one would expect that Chile, whic 
has experienced the most sustained growth of the four countries, should have 
gone significantly further than Uruguay toward achieving universalism, but 
this was not the case. 14 Moreover, if this argument were true, one would h~ve 
expected Chile to make the bulk of its progress toward universalism dunn~ 
the high-growth governments of President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) an_ 
President Eduardo Frei (1994-2000 ). Interestingly, however, Chile's most deci-
sive reforms toward greater universalism were carried out during the slower-
growth administrations of President Lagos and President Bachelet. 15 Th~s, 
while growth is an important contextual factor, and while the commodity . r 
boom of the early 2000s undoubtedly helped the move toward greater u~ive -
salism, it does not adequately explain variation across the Argentine, Chilean, 
Uruguayan, and Venezuelan cases. 
Political-Institutional Variables 
A second group of variables that have been found to influence the format~on 
and change of social policy in Latin America are political in nature, relau?g 
to political regime type, the design of state institutions, and the role of parties 
and interest groups. The first of these political-institutional arguments focu~e~ 
on the impact of democratic and authoritarian rule. Several studies of socia 
policy expansion and reform in Latin America find that democratic states 
tend to invest more in social welfare programs (Haggard and Kaufman 2008 ; 
McGuire 2010; Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Brown and Hunter 1999; 
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001) and that this spending tends to be mor~ 
egalitarian than that of authoritarian regimes (Huber et al. 2006). The bulk Of 
research about the effects of democracy on social policy focuses on the role 0 
electoral competition, which forces politicians to respond to citizen dema nds 
and increase social expenditure. McGuire (2010, 7-11) highlights other facets 
of democracy that may influence social policy design, especially in the he~~th 
sector. In particular, he notes that increased access to information, the ability 
to form advocacy groups, and increased attention to equal rights foster _an 
environment conducive to the expansion of basic health services. Other studies, 
however, question the impact of democracy on social spending, noting that the 
effect of political regime is mixed because democracy may empower privileged 
14 Chile's growth rates have been positive in all but two years between 1990 an<l 2010, according to 
the World Bank (2012). The country's average growth rate between 1990 and 2010 was 5·0.3 o/l, 
compared to 4.29%, 3.14 %, and 3 % for Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, respective Y 
(World Bank 2012; calculation by the author). 
' 5 Chile's average growth rate between 1990 and 1999 was 6.38%. By contrast, the aver 3ge 
growth rate between 2000 and 2009 was 3.67% (World Bank 2012; calculations by the author). 
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interest groups and promote poor policy design (Keefer 2009; Nelson 2007). 
All four countries in this study were democratic throughout the whole period 
of the analysis, 16 and the case studies presented in Chapters 3-7 reveal that 
one key element of democracy - the intensity of electoral competition - does 
have an important effect on the design of social policy reform. 
Perhaps the most widely cited institutional arguments about welfare state 
development and change focus on the design of political institutions and the 
impact of veto points (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Castiglioni 200 5a). 
In particular, Castiglioni (20op) finds that variation in the extent to which 
institutions concentrate political power helps explain differences in social pol-
icy outcomes in Chile and Uruguay between 1973 and 1998. I disagree with 
Castiglioni with regard to the importance of institutional variables. Specifically, 
I contend that the effect of veto points on social policy outputs is less significant 
than my three variables of interest: party character, electoral competition, and 
policy legacies. 
The literature highlights three institutional veto points that are important 
in dispersing political power: federalism, bicameralism, and referenda. For the 
cases of Chile and Uruguay, the causal importance of federalism and bicameral-
ism can be discounted, because both countries are unitary states with bicameral 
legislatures. While both cases of slow progress analyzed in this book-Argentina 
and Venezuela - are federal states, there is no evidence that the shared out-
come was related to the countries' institutional design. In fact, some scholars 
argue that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's efforts to centralize power 
have all but eliminated subnational autonomy in contemporary Venezuela 
(Corrales and Penfold 2011). All of this suggests that something other than 
federalism or bicameralism is driving variation in the character of social policy 
reforms. 
The cases in this analysis do vary with regard to the presence of mecha-
nisms of direct democracy (i.e., referenda and popular initiative), with Uruguay 
and Venezuela exhibiting this institutional characteristic while the other states 
do not. Since Uruguay's return to democracy, the use of referenda has had 
important consequences for national politics (Altman 2011 ), and there is some 
evidence that the institutional mechanism did indirectly affect social policy 
making in that country. 1 7 In interviews with political elites, however, I was 
consistently told that the ability to use the referenda mechanism is not equally 
plausible for all parties. Members of the three largest Uruguayan parties noted 
that the FA was particularly effective at calling for referenda. A deputy from 
Uruguay's Independent Party put it clearest, stating: 
16 The nature of Venezuela's political regime is a subject of intense debate. Freedom House 
scores Venezuela as "partly free," whereas Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are scored as "free" 
(Freedom House 2012). Thus, while the Venezuelan regime has moved toward autocratic 
tendencies, it has not yet been classified as "not free." 
1 7 The only successful use of the mechanism in association with social policy was the 1989 popular 
initiative that resulted in a guarantee that pensions would be increased at the same time and to 
the same magnitude as state workers' wages (Filgueira 199 5 ). 
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It's not the referenda mechanism on its own that was powerful. It was that rule in 
combination with the fact that FA was in opposition .... In fact, I would go so far as to 
say that with the exception of the 1989 initiative, without the FA there wouldn't have 
been any other referenda. (Personal Interview #9 r) 
This point was also made by FA legislators and suggests the institutional rule 
did not have a direct effect on policy output, but instead influenced outcomes 
by means of the FA's constituency-coordinating character. In this way, the role 
of the referenda in shaping social policy complements the argument presented 
in this book, illustrating yet another way in which the FA's party character 
influenced policy outputs. . 
Another institutional variable that has been found to influence social pol-
icy formation is the design of a country's electoral system (Iverson 2005). The 
countries in this study differ with regard to the design of electoral rules, and the 
variation, while not a direct cause of universalism, does shed light on the policy-
making process in each country. Specifically, Chile's binomial electoral system, 
which makes it difficult for a party to win both seats in any given congressional 
district, has traditionally resulted in an overrepresentation of the parties of the 
right (Carey 1997). The institutional design has also encouraged the formation 
of political coalitions. This marks an important difference between Chile and 
Uruguay, namely that the Concertaci6n is a coalition of center and left parties, 
whereas the FA is one party. This, in turn, influences social policy formati~n 
in each country, introducing additional obstacles in Chile that do not ex1st 
in Uruguay. A second institutional characteristic that influenced social policy 
formation in Chile was the designated senator rule, which existed until 20°5 
and granted special representation to the parties of the right. These two charac-
teristics of Chile's political institutional design influenced policy formation by 
constraining the institutional and partisan powers of the president, forcing the 
left/center-left Concertaci6n to negotiate with the opposition and with coalition 
partners (Castiglioni 2005a). My analysis confirms that these institutional rules 
had some impact on social policy formation in Chile, but I find these effects to 
be minor in comparison to party character, electoral competition, and policy 
legacies. Specifically, institutional design cannot explain why the Concertaci6n 
governments of the r99os and 2000s excelled in some policy domains, but not 
in others. It also fails to explain why the parties of the right were effective at 
opposing some initiatives, but had less of an effect on others. This variation 
is more thoroughly explained by party character, electoral competition, and 
policy legacies. 
Uruguay also has a peculiar electoral system, which provides for double 
simultaneous vote (the right to select both a party and a specific list) and 
proportional representation. 18 Both of these mechanisms help explain the 
fractionalized character of the country's political parties (Pineiro and Yaffe 
18 The 1996 electoral reform eliminated double-simultaneous-vote for the president by requiring 
parties to select one presidential candidate per party through primary elections. 
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2003). 19 Castiglioni (2005a) argues that the fractionalization of Uruguay's 
party system has resulted in greater power dispersion, which slowed efforts 
at retrenchment. By contrast, I argue that party fractionalization has had an 
indirect effect on social policy by influencing the organizational structure of 
the parties. In particular, I contend that the fractionalization of Uruguay's par-
ties is one of the contributing factors to the FA's constituency-coordinating 
structure because the high level of internal competition provides incentives to 
political elites to maintain strong ties to base organizations and work to expand 
territorial presence. In this way, institutional design has influenced the process 
of social policy reform in Chile and Uruguay, but I contend that its effects 
are minor in comparison to party character, electoral competition, and policy 
legacies. 
A final group of theories of social policy reform focus on the role of political 
parties, political leadership, unions, and interest groups in shaping the nature 
of reform efforts (Huber and Stephens 2012; Grindle 20046; Lloyd-Sherlock 
2004; Grindle 2004a; Nelson 2004; Kaufman and Nelson 2004c; Dion 2010; 
Madrid 2003; Brooks 2009; Castiglioni 2005a; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
2001; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Since the 1980s, 
Latin American political elites have faced an economic and social policy-making 
environment characterized by significant constraints. The neoliberal doctrine, 
which stresses downsizing the role of the state, scaling back social spending, 
and deregulating markets, has placed new political pressure on policy makers 
(Williamson 1990). Globalization has also influenced the policy-making envi-
ronment, as countries must compete on the international playing field and foster 
the confidence of international investors (Campello 2011; Brooks 2009; Rudra 
2002). Political parties in general, but particularly those of the left/center-left, 
which historically defended a state-led development model and publicly pro-
vided social protection, have been hard-hit by these international and domestic 
constraints. In addition to the pressure to shift their traditional policy positions, 
parties of the left/center-left have suffered as labor market flexibilization, trade 
liberalization, and the decline in public sector employment have resulted in a 
weakening of unions, the core constituency of the parties, both in terms of 
overall numbers and general political power (Weyland 2004a; Roberts 20026; 
Portes and Hoffman 2003; Dion 2010; Kurtz 2004). 
As a result of these constraints, some scholars have argued that ideologi-
cal differences between parties of the left and right have become increasingly 
small (Weyland 2004a). In this vein, some studies show that populist parties 
of the left/center-left have recently engaged in regressive social policy reforms 
(Madrid 2003; Kaufman and Nelson 2004a; Brooks 2009), whereas parties 
of the right/center-right have carried out progressive reforms in at least one 
case (Lakin 2006). These studies conclude, therefore, that party differences on 
' 9 To date, leadership within the FA has been quite fluid, with different fractions growing and 
declining in distinct moments (Pifieiro and Yaffe 2003 ). 
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matters of social policy are relatively unimportant. Still, a growing body of 
research finds that parties of the left and right vary with regard to how they 
design regulatory, labor, and social policy (Huber et al. 2006; Pribble, Huber, 
and Stephens 2009; Castiglioni 2oop; Murillo 2005, 2002; Kaufman and 
Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Blafield 2012). I contend that these seeming inconsisten-
cies in research findings result from the fact that debate about the impact of 
partisanship on policy outcomes has remained separate from research on polit-
ical party organization and linkage mechanisms, and that to fully understand 
the process of social policy reform, one must consider the overall character of a 
party, which I define as the combination of ideology, internal organization, and 
linkage mechanism. Indeed, while ideology does make a difference with regard 
to the general priorities of a party, that orientation is not always translated 
into corresponding actions, and I contend that such discrepancies result from 
variation in party organization and linkage mechanism. Thus, political par-
ties do influence social policy formation in Latin America, but to understand 
their effect, one must disaggregate the concept of party into three dimensions: 
ideology, organizational structure, and linkage mechanism. 
In addition to political parties, several studies of Latin American social 
policy focus on the role of unions and other interest groups in shaping the con-
tent and success of reform initiatives (Lloyd-Sherlock 2004; Grindle 20046, 
2004a; Kaufman and Nelson 2004c; Nelson 2007, 1999, 2000). The bulk of 
these studies find that labor unions have tended to resist reforms to education, 
health, and pension policy, and that, even when approved, the actors have 
often blocked effective implementation. Other research, however, finds that 
labor unions have not always been hostile to progressive social policy reforms 
and have even, on occasion, embraced efforts to expand protection to previ-
ously marginalized sectors of the population (Niedzwiecki 2010; Huber and 
Stephens 2012). I contend that this disagreement in the literature results from 
the fact that many studies focus directly on union behavior rather than ana-
lyzing the broader context in which labor unions formulate their preferences. 
In particular, I argue that the design of previous policy, or policy legacies, is 
crucial for understanding whether or not labor unions and other organized 
interest associations will support a given policy reform. In this way, the design 
of previous policy can either facilitate or inhibit the passage of policy reform 
by shaping the preferences of potential veto actors. 
Method, Research Design, and Case Selection 
The pages that follow provide a process-oriented account of social policy 
reform in Chile and Uruguay, with a secondary focus on Argentina and 
Venezuela. The study employs the qualitative method of process tracing to 
test my theoretical assumptions, drawing on original interview data from more 
than 135 in-depth interviews with political elites in Chile and Uruguay. I also 
analyze archival data gathered from an extensive study of press and legislative 
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reports. In the shadow case analysis of social policy reform in Argentina and 
Venezuela, I rely on secondary source information. Small-N qualitative stud-
ies are sometimes criticized for violating the norms of statistical research and 
for the inherent limits on the generalizability of findings (King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994). Still, a growing body of scholarship has emphasized the impor-
tant strengths of qualitative research, namely its ability to test causal pro-
cesses and probe a theory's internal validity (George and Bennett 2005; Goertz 
and Mahoney 2012; Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004). Specifically, these 
authors argue that qualitative methods provide unique leverage in establish-
ing causal inference because the studies analyze "causal process observations" 
rather than "dataset observations" (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 252-
264). Causal process observations, they note, are within-case observations 
that provide insight into how a relationship unfolded. Typically, scholars use 
these observations to carry out process tracing, which allows for two types of a 
hypothesis test: hoop tests and smoking-gun tests (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). 
This study employs process tracing to carry out a series of hoop tests that assess 
whether the causal sequence outlined in Chapter 2 actually played out in the 
manner that I have specified. A hoop test proposes that particular pieces of 
evidence must be present within a given case in order for the hypothesis to be 
confirmed (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). In Chapter 2, I highlight a series of 
expectations that identify such evidence. To perform these hoop tests, I draw on 
hundreds of causal process observations, revealing precisely how party charac-
ter, electoral competition, and policy legacies influenced social policy reforms 
in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The study focuses primarily on 
within-case variation, and I provide multiple probes of the hypotheses, analyz-
ing thirty-seven failed and successful reforms in three policy sectors inside each 
case. Thus, while the number of cases analyzed in this book is relatively small 
(four), the number of causal process observations is large, thereby allowing for 
a rigorous test of the hypotheses. 
Because the focus of this book is to assess whether party character, electoral 
competition, and policy legacies influenced social policy reform by means of the 
mechanisms specified in the next chapter, I select four cases that provide wide 
variation on these independent variables. The analysis of each of the four cases 
explores the mechanisms that link party character, electoral competition, and 
policy legacies to distinct types of social policy reform. Thus, I select Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela because they each represent a different type of 
party, display divergent levels of electoral competition, and exhibit distinct 
policy legacies. 
I focus on Chile and Uruguay as my primary cases of analysis for two 
reasons. First, Chile and Uruguay are similar in many regards, but exhibit 
interesting variation on the three key variables addressed by this study: pol-
icy legacies, electoral competition, and party character. In particular, Chile 
and Uruguay have very comparable levels of economic development, reach-
ing per capita GDP levels of US$rr,999.24 and US$rr,069.14, respectively, 
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in 2009 (Penn World Table 20rr). The two countries also exhibit sim~lar 
records of democracy, strong political institutions, high levels of state capacity, 
and institutionalized political parties. Moreover, both Chile and Uruguay are 
unitary states with low levels of ethnic and racial diversity. The two coun-
tries differ, however, with regard to policy legacies, electoral competition, and 
party character. Whereas Chile underwent a process of radical privatizat! 0 ~ 
in education, health care, and pension policy, Uruguay continues to exhib_it 
heavy state involvement in all social sectors except health care. Moreover, Ill 
Chile, the ruling left/center-left Concertaci6n governments faced intense elec-
toral competition from the right side of the political spectrum throughout the 
entire period of this analysis. By contrast, in Uruguay, the right/center-right 
Colorado and Blanco governments of the r99os and early 2000s faced intense 
electoral competition from the left/center-left FA. However, in 2004, when 
the FA assumed office, the left-leaning party faced weak electoral competition 
because of the Colorado's precipitous decline. With regard to party charac-
ter, Chile's left/center-left parties are electoral-professional in nature, whereas 
Uruguay's left/center-left Frente Amplio is a constituency-coordinating partf • 
Similarly, one of Chile's conservative parties, the Independent Democratic 
Union (UDI), is a constituency-coordinating organization, whereas Uruguay's 
traditional (right/center-right) parties exhibit an electoral-professional stru~-
ture. In this way, Chile and Uruguay provide clear contrasts on the key van-
ables in my framework, and therefore are the two primary cases analyzed in 
the book. 
I also chose to focus on Chile and Uruguay because the two countries have 
been among the most successful states in the region in advancing toward 
universalism. 20 In this way, they provide fertile territory for understanding 
how Latin American states have begun to move toward more inclusive wel-
fare policy. Progress in Chile and Uruguay, however, has been neither perfect 
nor uniform. In Chile, movement toward universalism is most evident in the 
domain of pension policy, with notable advancement in health care and more 
moderate improvement in education. In Uruguay, impressive progress occurred 
in the domain of family allowances, with important achievements in health care 
policy but little improvement in education. 
The inclusion of Argentina and Venezuela in a less detailed shadow anal-
ysis is instructive, as it provides greater variation on one of my key inde-
pendent variables: political party character. Indeed, Argentina and Venezuela 
exhibit levels of economic development that are similar to Chile and Uruguay, 
with a GDP per capita of US$rr,96r.40 and US$9,rr 5.39, respectively, Ill 
2009 (Penn World Table 2orr), but the two countries vary with regard 
to party character. In particular, both Argentina and Venezuela have been 
2° Costa Rica historically has had the most universalistic welfare state in the region (Martinez 
Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea 2012). The country, however, varies from Chile and Uruguay 
with regard to its historical trajectory, thereby making a controlled comparison difficult. 
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governed by a non-programmatic-electoral party of the left/center-left: the Per-
onist Party (PJ) in Argentina and the Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and 
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) in Venezuela. 2 ' Critics may wonder why I 
selected Argentina and Venezuela rather than Brazil and Bolivia - two coun-
tries with well-known left/center-left parties that have made advancement in 
the domain of social policy. While I do discuss both of these cases in the con-
clusion of the book, it did not make good theoretical sense to include them in 
this analysis for two reasons. In the case of Brazil, the left-leaning Workers' 
Party (PT) exhibits a party character similar to Chile's Concertacion parties 
at the national level and an organization reminiscent of Uruguay's FA at the 
local level. Thus, inclusion of Brazil would not provide greater variation with 
regard to my primary variable of interest: party character. While Bolivia would 
provide a fourth party type, the country exhibits a dramatically different level 
of economic development than that of Chile and Uruguay, which makes a 
structured comparison very difficult. 
Although Argentina and Venezuela are both federal states, I focus on 
national-level policy initiatives. While subnational variation likely exists in 
both countries, with certain states or provinces exhibiting better coverage and 
service quality than others, universalism requires that all citizens, regardless 
of geographic location, have access to a minimum standard of protection. 
Such minimum standards are typically enforced through federal mandates, and 
therefore I focus my attention on national-level policy formation. 
The research design utilized in this book, therefore, provides for a stringent 
test of the hypotheses. The causal process observations utilized to assess the 
internal validity of the theoretical framework provide systematic evidence of 
the mechanisms that link party character, electoral competition, and policy 
legacies to reform outcomes. In this way, the study is an example of how 
qualitative methods can be effectively used for a particular type of hypothesis 
testing. The book, therefore, makes an important contribution to the growing 
literature about the logic of qualitative social science inquiry. 
Although qualitative analyses have many strengths, they are unable to ade-
quately assess the external validity of a theory because of the difficulty of 
generalizing from such a small number of cases (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 
2004). In light of this limitation, it is important to clearly delineate the bound-
ary conditions of this argument. The theoretical framework established in this 
book does not seek to provide a grand theory of policy reform that can be 
generalized to all corners of the globe for all periods of time. Rather, I seek 
to explain a small population of countries, namely Latin America's advanced 
21 As mentioned previously, the PSUV is located further to the left than other parties in the analysis, 
but for reasons of parsimony I choose to group left and center-left parties into one category. I 
also recognize that the PJ is not a traditional left/center-left party, but rather tends to exhibit 
ideological flexibility, sometimes being led by left-leaning elites and other times reflecting more 
conservative tendencies. 
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social protection states, during the 1990s and 2ooos. 22 These countries include 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
This book is organized into three parts. In the first part (Chapters r and 2), I 
develop a theoretical framework that seeks to explain patterns of social policy 
reform in contemporary Latin America. In the second part (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 
and 6), I use process tracing to analyze successful and failed attempts to reform 
health care, noncontributory social assistance, and education policy in Chile 
and Uruguay since each country's transition to democracy. I also describe how 
political parties in each country evolved and why they consolidated distinct 
organizational characteristics. In the final part (Chapters 7 and 8), I employ a 
structured comparison to assess the capacity of my theoretical framework to 
explain successful and failed policy reforms in two secondary cases: Argentina 
and Venezuela. I conclude with a reflection about the book's main findings, 
highlighting important theoretical and practical implications of the study. 
22 
Thi~ temporal focus is important because the global economic context shifted significantlY 
durmg the e~r.ly 200 0~, as many Latin American states began to enjoy a favorable export 
ma:ket .. A?dmonally, mternational financial institutions and the policy community altered 
thetr thmkmg about the role of the state in providing social services and transfers. 
